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Abstract 
What is at stake here? I want to present ‘cultural techniques of law’ as a research and pedagogical 
programme - a ‘format’ - which has developed between the disciplines of law, media studies and cultural 
studies; or more precisely, at the interstices of these respective disciplinary boundaries (Vismann 2012a). 
I do so in the form of an essay and try to make some further suggestions for the programme. The essay is 
written from a position that is not fully identical with ‘law’. The term ‘format’ is meant to reflect the 
existence of such a programme, without claiming that it has been realised successfully. Such an 
incomplete identification of law with the method of its study is not a co-incidence. The starting point to 
think about law ought to be law’s difference rather than identity. It is in this sense that cultural techniques 
of law are the techniques of differentiation, modification and transmission that reproduce law. Culture 
does not refer to a historically stabilised identity, but only to what is made and reproduced. Cultural 
techniques of law are techniques that ‘operationalise’ legal differences: they divide, translate and transmit 
legal differences along (pre)formed, directed, exterior routes. 
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Excerpt from 
Cultural Techniques of Law.  
Remarks on a Format of Legal Studies
Fabian Steinhauer1
1 Symmetrical dogmatics and parajuridical training
What is at stake here? I want to present ‘cultural techniques of law’ 
as a research and pedagogical programme - a ‘format’ -  which has 
developed between the disciplines of law, media studies and cultural 
studies; or more precisely, at the interstices of these respective 
disciplinary boundaries (Vismann 2012a). I do so in the form of an 
essay and try to make some further suggestions for the programme. 
The essay is written from a position that is not fully identical with 
‘law’. The term ‘format’ is meant to reflect the existence of such a 
programme, without claiming that it has been realised successfully. 
Such an incomplete identification of law with the method of its study 
is not a co-incidence. The starting point to think about law ought to 
be law’s difference rather than identity. It is in this sense that cultural 
techniques of law are the techniques of differentiation, modification and 
transmission that reproduce law. Culture does not refer to a historically 
stabilised identity, but only to what is made and reproduced.  Cultural 
techniques of law are techniques that ‘operationalise’ legal differences: 
they divide, translate and transmit legal differences along (pre)formed, 
directed, exterior routes. Research about law’s cultural techniques rests 
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on these two premises: legal differences are reproduced and they are 
‘operationalised’.
What is the point of this peculiar ‘ format’? Why shall we not proceed as 
before?  The programme intends to serve as a kind of hinge between 
academic studies of law and cultural- and media studies and addresses 
scholars of law, humanities, media and cultural studies.  It could also 
be described as part of what Latour termed a “symmetrical dogmatics” 
of law (1995). He conceived of a “symmetrical anthropology”, which 
he did not explicitly sketch out as a theorisation of constitutionalism, 
but which nonetheless helps us to think through foundational juridical 
issues. It aims at being a historical epistemology that thinks with 
its own, constitutive division, whilst simultaneously being reflective 
about the exclusions that this process engenders and the ways in 
which the excluded continue to exert a constitutive role. In Latour’s 
anthropological context, this approach allows thinking with and 
about what escapes the boundaries of humanness and yet continues 
to shape it (for example, the entities that he calls “things”). This kind 
of working-with or co-operation (Mitarbeit) is full of complications. 
It would neither be accurately characterised as an interdisciplinary 
“pairing”, nor can this cooperation described as being sufficiently 
contradictory to be labelled dialectical. My comments here serve to 
present these complications. 
The proposed research programme of cultural techniques is rooted in 
a critique of modernity’s constitution, its self-imaginaries, and systems 
of self-descriptions, as far as these are grounded in internalist claims 
and epistemic differentiations that are monopolistic and exclusionary. 
One such internalist view of legal self-constitution is the idea that law 
reproduces itself with the help of continuous and all-encompassing main 
medium, for example, with language, sense perception or consciousness. 
Critiquing such a view, cultural techniques as a research programme 
particularly attends to ‘silent’ knowledge techniques in order to trace 
ruptures in legal reproduction. Muteness is not only a theoretical 
concept, but also a metaphor for interruptions of continuity of language 
and senses. Something extinguishes and something else approaches 
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(rückt an) over the course of law’s continuous reproduction. Thereby 
some processes come to our attention that can neither be  explained 
by referring to law as a “semantic power” (posited, but not defined in 
von Bogdandy/Venzke 2014), or portray it as an “idea of sovereign 
consciousness” (Foucault 2000: 16) ... What is metaphorically called 
‘silent knowledge’ occurs in a sphere that both exceeds and lies beyond 
the nameable or conceptually conceivable. The effects of muteness, that 
is to say, of such a constructed muteness, occurs in law’s subterrains and 
also contributes (mitarbeitet) to its original foundation and justification 
(Begründung). As a result, it forms part of what Cornelia Vismann had 
termed “arca-logic” (2012b). As law’s medium that is located ‘under’ 
or ‘below’ causes and foundations (Gründen), the arca-logic of cultural 
techniques participates in the production and reproduction of law. 
Cultural techniques form and shape arca-logic’s archives, principles and 
premises, but also are part of the origin which disguises itself, which 
it has always already has done from its very inception. 
Yet law’s cultural techniques ought not to be mistaken as 
foundation or as a reason (Grund). They also cannot be explained by 
or mystified into subjects.  Although the research format of cultural 
techniques depicts in detail the technological and mediated substrata 
of ‘foundations’, something which dogmatic approaches to legal 
scholarship unreflexively take for granted, such substrata do not 
necessarily represent better foundations. Insights into the underlying 
workings of law rather make visible the subversions through which law 
works and reproduces differences. Law operationalises the substrata, but 
never extinguishes them. That is why this proposed research format does 
not purport to bring law ‘back’ to foundational ‘facts’. Rather it seeks 
to delineate the circumstances in which law differentiates and remains 
fundamentally equivocal - with both precision and ambiguity. This 
endeavour is thus both critical and constructive: it is critical of the ways 
in which juridical reasoning selectively represents law’s unavoidable and 
necessary demi-monde, and it is constructive in the sense that a study 
of law’s cultural techniques highlights law’s constant need to cooperate 
(with others and us). Law is made-together and made-with. 
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This research programme does not intend to refute or negate the 
role of language and its meaning for law. But it also seeks to point out 
limitations originating from language as well as the ones relating to it. 
A study of law’s cultural techniques also takes into account premises 
that have their origin in science studies theories, such as in Latour. They 
allow for a reconstruction of knowledges that have hitherto remained 
unexamined because they were invisible under the radars of human 
subject, its laws, causalities and rationality. 
...
On “symmetrical dogmatics”: Symmetry is not synonymous to 
‘supplement’, ‘harmony’ or ‘ joining’, but rather denotes the double 
existence of law’s recurring differentiation, which occurs together and 
simultaneously with a carefully constructed internalist programme 
in the study of law. Although I would portray research into law’s 
cultural techniques as forming part of basic research2, I do not claim 
that it satisfies the craving for meaning (“Geltungssucht”) or provides 
fundamental meanings and foundations. Law’s theories and practices 
are remarkably successful in (re)producing their own meaning - even 
when legal decisions lead to nowhere - and they are not in need any 
support from media or cultural studies to assert their symbolic meaning. 
The mutual interest in and the extent of decentralised cooperation and 
coordination between law and the rest of society are, however, too big 
to be determined by a particular legal symbolic meaning alone.3 A 
focus on law’s cultural techniques can take account of the continuous 
“re-entry of the Other” within law, a process which also simultaneously 
occurs within law’s “boundary objects” (Star and Griesemer 1989). 
These already form part of law’s decision-making and differentiation. It 
is in this sense that symmetrical dogmatics is also paradogmatic.  And 
research on cultural techniques of law can be understood as forming 
part of a parajuridical formation or training. Such a parajuridical 
programme traces passages in which transmissions and translations 
dissect and examine law in a continuous, historical way. There is neither 
a mind nor a being, not to mention a consciousness, of which such an 
examination and disentanglement (Auseinandersetzung) are part or 
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could be placated by (as in early laws regarding pictures, discussed 
in Steinhauer 2013: 96-114). All forms of reflection go together with 
blindness (Steinhauer 2009b).  ...
Research of law’s cultural techniques does not claim completeness 
towards the study of law because it is based on the premise that law 
comprises fragmented and irreconcilable discourses and rationalities. 
It however aims to account for and think with contradictions, 
ruptures, conflicts and uncertainties of legal practice. It also puts itself 
into competition with other kinds of knowledge which have their 
own ‘ juridisms’: norms, canons, standards, classics and rules of the 
humanities; natural science’s focus on heredity; or norm formations 
in practices outside academia or its disciplines. This implies that there 
is all a greater need to continue writing about histories of conflicts, 
unruly cooperation and unpacified coordination. A focus on the cultural 
techniques of law attends to and anticipates abysses of legal rationality 
rather than focusing on questions of law’s foundation (Legendre 2010). 
...
2 Cultural techniques and textuality
Impetus for research into cultural techniques of law has also come 
from works on law’s textuality by Augsberg (2009), Ladeur (2016) 
and Vesting (2011-9). ... They share the view that there is no specific 
and definable crux of what legal studies ought to be. Whilst they do 
not deny that legal knowledge is theoretically and practically distinct 
from other kinds of knowledges and needs to be distinguished from 
them, this realisation alone does not suffice. The recognition of law’s 
difference does not rest on philosophical notions of law’s substance, 
form, method, meaning or process. Rather it rests on law’s disquiet, 
and law ought to be thought from this point of restlessness. Law’s 
references are both its own (eigen) and outside itself. I would denote 
law’s mode of referentiality, its way of reconnecting and reproducing, 
as one of hyper-referentiality than an exclusive self-reference. It 
constitutes itself through an act of separation from a reference, whilst 
also simultaneously ecstatically constituting and continuing the 
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divisive distinction within the reference itself.  Law differentiates itself 
through its references, yet such acts of distinction also permeate the 
very references themselves.  ... Wherever we encounter law’s identity, 
alterity is already there at work. One could interpret this as an empty 
tautology of circumstances in which only law is able to (re)produce law, 
as in some readings of Kelsen’s positivism. But the tautology does not 
work without complications because law’s (re)production depends on 
sharing (dividing) and transmitting legal knowledge.4 Law is in conflict 
(Auseinandersetzung) with itself by dismantling (auseinandersetzt) itself 
and effecting both identity and alterity. It attaches itself to something 
that might not be legal and is exterior to it. Law’s limits are yet also 
internal; they go through itself. They are both insistent, as well as 
intervening. In the midst of law, we find files, staples of paper, witnesses, 
sluggish bodies, networks, stations, a selection of programmes, court 
architectures, high and low ceiling rooms, streets, morasses, and much 
more. In the midst of a legal subject, we may find flesh, skin, horn, 
hair, capital and assets, organisations and apparatus.  In the midst of 
persons, we find things. The juridical is permeated by the political, 
moral, religious and all the forces that it promised to repudiate.   Legal 
positivism is rattled with uncertainty and harbours a sense of lack and 
insufficiency within it, regardless of whether such a lack is productive 
or not. ... Law can be understood as the effect of a continuing process 
of differentiation that is always also lacking; the effect of such a lack 
is permanent openness.5 [...] Instead of being content with empty 
and internalist self-sufficiency, legal research that follows this insight 
would identify and particularly focus on issues which manifest law’s 
lack of differentiation and examine the specific ways in which it deals 
with such a lack.  
3 Media studies and law
Media studies have had a long-standing interest in law. In German 
media theory, research into cultural techniques has incorporated diverse 
approaches that have had interest in processes that fall within the 
legal field. Works by Dommann (2014), Gaderer (2012), Giessmann 
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(2014), Kossmann (2012), Nellen, Siegert (2006), Sprenger (2015) 
and Vismann (2008, 2011, 2012) share such a specific media studies 
approach and it could form part of a programme of symmetrical 
dogmatics and para-juridical training. They resist the imposition and 
the ideal of an internalist self-proclamation prevalent in the German 
academic landscape, which insist that only lawyers are lawyers, lawyers 
are only lawyers, and that knowledge about law and legislations are 
exclusive or privileged domains of the Faculties of Law. ... The sub-
discipline of legal history and its related disciplines share an interest 
with media studies: they examine the ways in which law fabricates 
itself with the help of something exterior to its self-definition. Lessig 
has expressed this with his well-known statement that “code is law”, 
but also unfortunately smoothed over the innate tension between 
identity and alterity that are at play in the moment when law refers to 
cultural techniques. Law does not recognise itself in the code. Rather 
the code repeats and re-enforces the conditions of cooperation and 
coordination, which are regarded as ‘law’ in other social contexts. 
More interestingly and maintaining the inherent tension (but also the 
contradiction) between media and law, Kittler observed how media 
techniques are co-constitutive of law (2014). His assertion of media’s 
importance is not trivial (“what else should law produce but media?”), 
as he brings into vision media’s juridicality, which is different from 
legal ways of knowing. This distinction does not mean that media 
is not juridical. Rather, media’s juridicality is similar to the effect of 
what Schütz described as law outside law (2012).  One of the central 
modes by which legal knowledges operates is by separating itself from 
others.  Similarly, media techniques entail juridical operations of 
decision-making, openness and blockages of access (Sprenger 2013). 
Also media define social categories, such as goods, things, personalities 
and subjectivities, notion of publicness and privacy, and of sharing 
and limiting. The processes of ordering and co-ordinating, voting and 
conflict resolution - all of which are often regarded as juridical processes 
- have become embedded in things. These things are not inert ‘facts’, 
but they are the modes through which ‘law’ is made without ‘legal’ 
methods. ...
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I want to illustrate this point with an example of law relating to 
personality in pictures. The legal practice in this area is concerned 
with images to a large extent. Yet legal dogma has neither developed a 
particular concept of what an image is, nor a deeper conceptualisation 
of its own treatment of images (Steinhauer 2009a). A lawyer makes 
decisions about images without being a scholar or theorist of images. 
Lawyers think that law decides over images; scholars of images 
think that images decide law. Regardless of these different self-
understandings, the law of personality keeps on reproducing itself in 
both the legal concept of personality, as well as in images, continuing 
to carry out the expectation which a legal subject holds in the form of 
rights to an image and within (as part of) an image. 
Knowledge of images remains in the status of an ‘other’ knowledge. 
... Scholarship of images is inflected with its own juridicality. Every 
knowledge of an image hence is bounded - and this boundary remains 
as contested as much as unsurpassable (see Hubermann 2009 on Kafka’s 
‘Before the Law’).  This is why it is impossible to discard law - or take 
off the legal lens - and invoke and rely on allegedly innocent or pure 
‘facts’. Beyond law, there are not only others than law, but also often 
another law. This does not mean that it is impossible to differentiate. The 
boundaries between law and image remain recalcitrant and cannot be 
ignored or denied. And the differentiation between image and no-image 
cannot be relinquished, same as the differentiation between law and 
non-law. We need to take a leap, so to say, and cultivate a knowledge, 
but not of the kind that engages in internalist self-assertions. It would 
entail reconstructing differentiations that cannot be traced back to a 
common starting point and uniform discourse, but which only retain 
their differences in diversity. It would be necessary, however, not to 
get lost in the infinity of differences and differentiations. For purposes 
of critique and analysis, the focus would need to be on tracing those 
differentiations that have been regarded as ‘really useful’. ... Attending 
to law’s Others means to think about the lines, conflicts, definitions 
and exclusions, from which law is (re)produced (for examples of such 
analyses, see Steinhauer 2015).
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4 Guiding Questions 
The main question which the format of cultural techniques of law 
raises for legal research and pedagogy is: how is knowledge of and 
around law transmitted and shared? This question entails four aspects. 
The first aspect concerns law’s foundations embedded in certain 
media and cultural techniques, as well as production of a certain kind 
of legality through media and practices in society. Writing, codex, 
diagrams, commentaries, certificates, but also court room architectures 
are well-known examples of such media. Computers and their networks 
are some of the most discussed examples since the nineteen-sixties. 
Exegetic processes of juridical hermeneutic are also well-known 
instances of legal techniques, much of which are nowadays found outside 
of orality, writing and printed books. Rhetoric and dogmatics are some 
of the most well-known paradigms of assembling cultural techniques 
into a discipline. 
The second aspect of the question touches upon how law co-
constitutes media and cultural techniques. Rules of censorship and book 
privileges, the shaping the development of book, are some historical 
examples. More recent examples are coded privileges and access 
limitations that implement digital licenses and usage rights. Here, legal 
normativity has become ‘built in’: codes are technical achievements of 
engineers and programmers; but they are also a juridical feat by which 
a technical object becomes ‘normed’, receives an imperative dimension 
(it orders the realm of what is possible and legally permitted), and 
delineates and (co-)determines over social rules of access.  ...
The question raises a third aspect about processes of transmission 
and translation between and within cultures (historically, for example).
Lastly, the question addresses foundations of media law. The concept 
of public media, in particular, lead to an entanglement of legal, media 
and cultural-technical phenomena. Legal knowledge is not only a sense-
phenomenon, it is also an effect of media and of cultural techniques. 
... Law is not only a creation of state sovereignty, but media changes 
produce shifts in legal and normative practices beyond instances of 
‘state’ ‘reasoning’. Moreover, structural changes within law do not 
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only arise from institutionalised politics and economy. New media and 
cultural techniques change and shape whatever remains recognisable 
and understandable as law. 
Endnotes
Translated in parts by Hyo Yoon Kang. Originally published in German: 
(2017) ‘Kuturtechniken des Rechts. Anmerkungen zu einem Format der 
Rechtswissenschaft’ in Formate der Rechtswissenschaft, eds Funke A & 
Lachmayer K Velbrueck Wissenschaft Weilerswist: 255-274. 
1. Notes to translation: Rechtswissenschaft transl. as legal studies; 
Kulturwissenschaften as cultural studies; Kulturtechniken des Rechts as cultural 
techniques of law; Trennung as division, separation; Auseinandersetzung 
as conflict, disentanglement, examination; auseinandersetzen to examine, 
disentangle
2. Translator’s clarification: in contrast to applied research or practice.
3. Society does not need to have a sense of ‘social’ and can also be effective 
‘asocially’.
4. As Foucault pointed out the nature of language is double (1996).
5. The notion of an ongoing openness is a remainder or a rest of a 
differentiation, which has already occurred, but still remains left over. 
Damisch (2007: 135) best describes the problematisation of ‘opening’ and 
also refers to Trotsky’s notion of permanent revolution and Heidegger’s 
discussion of Heraclitus. Heidegger argues against an understanding of 
opening as “an open window” or “passage”. In relations between human 
and things, “human openness towards things does not mean that there is 
a gap or hole through which humans can peek through” (Heidegger 1986: 
202, translator’s translation). 
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